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'It is not the purpose of this judgment to go further into the topic of alienation. Most Family judges have, for some time, regarded the label of ‘parental alienation’, and the suggestion that there may be a diagnosable syndrome of that name, as being unhelpful. What is important, as with domestic abuse, is the particular behaviour that is found to have taken place within the individual family before the court, and the impact that that behaviour may have had on the relationship of a child with either or both of his/her parents. In this regard, the identification of ‘alienating behaviour’ should be the court’s focus, rather than any quest to determine whether the label ‘parental alienation’ can be applied.'

'I am in no doubt that [the mother's] actions amount to coercive and controlling behaviour towards the children and towards the father...'

'In summary, in a situation of parental alienation the obligation on the court is to respond with exceptional diligence and take whatever effective measures are available. The situation calls for judicial resolve because the line of least resistance is likely to be less stressful for the child and for the court in the short term. But it does not represent a solution to the problem. Inaction will probably reinforce the position of the stronger party at the expense of the weaker party and the bar will be raised for the next attempt at intervention. Above all, the obligation on the court is to keep the child's medium to long term welfare at the forefront of its mind and wherever possible to uphold the child and parent's right to respect for family life before it is breached. In making its overall welfare decision the court must therefore be alert to early signs of alienation. What will amount to effective action will be a matter of judgement, but it is emphatically not necessary to wait for serious, worse still irreparable, harm to be done before appropriate action is taken. It is easier to conclude that decisive action was needed after it has become too late to take it.'

'It is clear that the child's expressed views are that she wishes to remain living with the mother (…) However, all of her views have to be assessed having regard to the fact that they are distorted by the prism of alienation.'

'it is a condition of contact that the children have to decide for each contact whether to take it up or not…in reality this burdens them with a responsibility they should not be asked to bear at the respective ages of 12 and 13.'

'the manipulation of the child by the other parent need not be malicious or even deliberate. It is the process that matters, not the motive. Where a child’s relationship with one parent is not working for no apparent good reason, signs of alienation may be found on the part of the other parent. These may include portraying the other parent in an unduly negative light to the child, suggesting that the other parent does not love the child, providing unnecessary reassurance to the child about time with the other parent, contacting the child excessively when with the other parent, and making unfounded allegations or insinuations, particularly of sexual abuse.'

'...the obligation on the court is to keep the child’s medium to long term welfare at the forefront of its mind and wherever possible to uphold the child and parent’s right to respect for family life before it is breached. In making its overall welfare decision the court must therefore be alert to early signs of alienation.'

'I accept that whilst there will be short-term harm and distress for the child as a result of moving to the father's care, underlying the current estrangement lie the foundations of a positive and beneficial relationship between the child and her father.’

'Having considered the authorities to which I have referred, and others, there is, in my view, a danger in placing too much emphasis on the phrase "last resort" used by Thorpe LJ and Coleridge J in Re: A. It is well established that the court cannot put a gloss on to the paramountcy principle in CA 1989, s 1. I do not read the judgments in Re: A as purporting to do that. The test is, and must always be, based on a comprehensive analysis of the child's welfare and a determination of where the welfare balance points in terms of outcome. It is important to note that the welfare provisions in CA 1989, s 1 are precisely the same provisions as those applying in public law children cases where a local authority may seek the court's authorisation to remove a child from parental care either to place them with another relative or in alternative care arrangements. Where, in private law proceedings, the choice, as here, is between care by one parent and care by another parent against whom there are no significant findings, one might anticipate that the threshold triggering a change of residence would, if anything, be lower than that justifying the permanent removal of a child from a family into foster care. Use of phrases such as "last resort" or "draconian" cannot and should not indicate a different or enhanced welfare test. What is required is for the judge to consider all the circumstances in the case that are relevant to the issue of welfare, consider those elements in the s 1(3) welfare check list which apply on the facts of the case and then, taking all those matters into account, determine which of the various options best meets the child's welfare needs.'

'CA 1989 s 1(4)(a) requires the court to have regard to "the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding)."

'Whilst it is a fundamental principle, applicable to every case, that the child who is the subject of the proceedings shall be heard, the manner and the degree to which the child is heard will vary from case to case. Further, it is important to bear in mind that each element in the welfare checklist is subject to the overarching requirement in CA 1989, s 1(1) that the welfare of the child must be the court's paramount consideration.'

'The test to be applied to the mother's conduct in the context of the appeal is whether it can properly be said to be 'reprehensible' or whether her stance in bringing and then prosecuting the appeal was unreasonable. In favour of that conclusion the father is able to rely upon the litigation history not only of this appeal but of the whole sequence of earlier hearings before HHJ Davies and Peel J during which the mother's substantive case with respect to the judge's findings and the children's welfare wholly failed.'